Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind

Notes on Contributors. Introduction: Jonathan Cohen (University of California, San Diego). Part I: Mental Content:. Is There a Viable Notion of Narrow Mental Content?. 1. Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions: Gabriel Segal (King's College, London). 2. There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content: Sarah Sawyer (University of Nebraska-Lincoln). Is Externalism about Mental Content Compatible with Privileged Access?. 3. Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent: Anthony Brueckner (University of California, Santa Barbara). 4. Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent: Michael McKinsey (Wayne State University). Is the Intentional Essentially Normative?. 5. Normativism Defended: Ralph Wedgwood (University of Oxford). 6. Resisting Normativism in Psychology: Georges Rey (University of Maryland at College Park). Is There Non-Conceptual Content?. 7. The Revenge of the Given: Jerry Fodor (Rutgers University). 8. Are There Different Kinds of Content?: Richard G. Heck Jr (Brown University). Part II: Physicalism:. Is Non-Reductive Materialism Viable?. 9. Everybody Has Got It: A Defense of Non-Reductive Materialism: Louise Antony (University of Massachusetts, Amherst). 10. The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism: Paul M. Churchland (University of California, San Diego). Should Physicalists Be A Priori Physicalists?. 11. A Priori Physicalism: Frank Jackson (Australian National University). 12. On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism: Brian P. McLaughlin (Rutgers University). Is There an Unresolved Problem of Mental Causation?. 13. Causation and Mental Causation: Jaegwon Kim (Brown University). 14. Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough: Barry Loewer (Rutgers University). Part III: The Place of Consciousness in Nature:. Is Consciousness Ontologically Emergent from the Physical?. 15. Dualist Emergentism: Martine Nida-Rumelin (University of Fribourg, Switzerland). 16. Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness: David Braddon-Mitchell (University of Sydney). Are Phenomenal Characters and Intentional Contents of Experiences Identical?. 17. New Troubles for the Qualia Freak: Michael Tye (University of Texas at Austin). 18. A Case for Qualia: Sydney Shoemaker (Cornell University). Is Awareness of Our Mental Acts a Kind of Perceptual Consciousness?. 19. All Consciousness Is Perceptual: Jesse Prinz (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill). 20. Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I): Christopher Peacocke (Columbia University). Index