Research on the carbon emission regulation and optimal state of market structure: Based on the perspective of evolutionary game of different stages

In the background of green and low-carbon development, many enterprises still have illegal emission behaviors to obtain excess revenue. Therefore, it is an urgent problem to restrain the illegal emission behaviors of enterprises through external supervision. This paper mainly studies the regulatory system composed of government and enterprises. We divide the regulation into two phases: loose regulation and strict regulation, analyzed the impact of government regulatory intensity on carbon emission behavior enterprises and industry market structure through the evolutionary game model. The results show that with the increase of the intensity of government supervision, leading enterprises will gradually complete the transformation and upgrading from low carbon to compliant production. The leading enterprises with low carbon technology have strengthened their dominant position in the market, while the enterprises without low carbon technology are constrained by carbon emissions and can only continue to stay in the industry market by buying carbon emission rights or exiting the market. The industry market structure gradually changed from a decentralized competition structure to a centralized oligopoly structure.