认识论
客观性(哲学)
米勒
构造(python库)
科学哲学
哲学
计算机科学
生态学
生物
程序设计语言
摘要
D. Miller's demonstrations of the language dependence of truthlikeness raise a profound problem for the claim that scientific progress is objective. In two recent papers (Barnes 1990, 1991) I argue that the objectivity of progress may be grounded on the claim that the aim of science is not merely truth but knowledge; progress thus construed is objective in an epistemic sense. In this paper I construct a new solution to Miller's problem grounded on the notion of “approximate causal explanation” which allows for linguistically invariant progress outside an epistemic context. I suggest that the notion of “approximate causal explanation” provides the resources for a more robust theory of progress than that provided by the notion of “approximate truth.”
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