激励
发展中国家
业务
微观经济学
经济
产业组织
知识管理
计算机科学
经济增长
作者
Shihong Xiao,Ying‐Ju Chen,Christopher S. Tang
出处
期刊:Operations Research
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2020-01-29
被引量:29
标识
DOI:10.1287/opre.2019.1869
摘要
In developing economies, smallholders apply their own specialized knowledge and exert costly effort to manage their farms. To raise overall productivity, NGOs and governments are advocating various knowledge-sharing and learning platforms for farmers to exchange a variety of farming techniques. Putting altruism aside, we examine the overall economic implications for heterogeneous farmers sharing their private knowledge voluntarily with others under (implicit) competition. By analyzing a multiperson sequential game, we find that farmers with high knowledge are reluctant to share knowledge, and consequently, the voluntary shared level is always lower than or equal to the "efficient" shared level that maximizes farmer welfare under coordination. This finding is motivational in developing a reward mechanism to entice farmers to elevate their knowledge shared level in a decentralized system so as to maximize farmer welfare. On reviewing different mechanisms, we propose a quota-based reward mechanism that can entice farmers to share knowledge voluntarily up to the efficient shared level.
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