道德解脱
怀疑论
道德的社会认知理论
道德权威
道德推理
道德心理学
含蓄的态度
心理学
社会心理学
道德发展
社会直觉主义
认识论
道德责任
哲学
作者
Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong,C. Daryl Cameron
出处
期刊:Oxford University Press eBooks
[Oxford University Press]
日期:2022-04-14
卷期号:: 563-583
标识
DOI:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198871712.013.29
摘要
Traditional theories about moral judgments adopt one side of a dichotomy between beliefs and desires, emotions, or attitudes, but neither side seems adequate. New intermediate possibilities are opened up if implicit moral attitudes are distinguished from explicit moral beliefs. This chapter summarizes some recent empirical work on implicit moral attitudes, and explores potential philosophical lessons and compromise positions, such as that explicit moral assertions and beliefs are cognitive or propositional but implicit moral attitudes are not; that implicit moral attitudes are internally connected to motivation but explicit moral beliefs are not; that moral responsibility requires both explicit moral beliefs and implicit moral attitudes; and that implicit moral attitudes might be able to stop the sceptical regress, if certain further features of implicit moral attitudes are established. Each of these potential lessons requires further development but seems interesting enough to warrant exploration.
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