古诺竞争
盈利能力指数
授权
背景(考古学)
福利
业务
企业社会责任
双头垄断
协调失败
社会福利
产业组织
经济
微观经济学
市场经济
财务
管理
生态学
生物
古生物学
政治学
法学
作者
Mingqing Xing,Sang‐Ho Lee
摘要
Abstract We consider a polluting Cournot duopoly within a managerial delegation framework and examine conflicting environmental concerns in which the owners pursue strategic environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) while the managers undertake diverged environmental research and development (ER&D) investment. We investigate the effects of cooperation in both ECSR and ER&D on a firm's profitability and social welfare and find that managerial coordination has a critical effect on industry emissions, profits, and welfare. In the context of an optimal emissions tax, we show that managerial coordination failure might not occur, but it reduces welfare if the environmental damage is relatively high. We conclude that a pro‐environmental government should encourage cooperative ER&D, especially when owners adopt cooperative ECSR.
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