Event-Triggered Control for Networked Systems Under Denial of Service Attacks and Applications

In this paper, the resilient controller design and synthesis issues of networked control systems under denial-of-service (DoS) attacks are investigated via an adaptive event-triggered strategy. In a networked control system, DoS attacks have serious impacts on the security of communication, possibly causing degraded stability performance of the system. To remove threats from DoS attacks, an adaptive event-triggered communication mechanism is proposed, which also provides benefits in reducing the consumption of communication resources and relieving the pressure on network bandwidth. Since the system state information is usually not fully known, an observer-based controller is developed to stabilize the system and maintain a desired performance index despite the occurrence of stochastic attacks. Furthermore, a joint design method is proposed to obtain the controller gain, observer gain and event-triggered weight matrix. Finally, practical examples based on a four-tank system, an Internet-based three-tank system and an Internet-based test rig system are presented to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed techniques to respond and eliminate the impact of DoS attacks.