供应链
业务
私人信息检索
价值(数学)
微观经济学
透明度(行为)
产业组织
偏爱
议价能力
信息不对称
相关性(法律)
经济
营销
计算机科学
计算机安全
机器学习
政治学
法学
作者
Fadong Chen,Yingshuai Zhao,Ulrich W. Thonemann
标识
DOI:10.1287/msom.2022.1138
摘要
Problem definition: We analyzed the value of response time information in supply chain bargaining and how the transparency of response times affects bargaining dynamics and outcomes. Academic/practical relevance: The research on supply chain bargaining has focused on agents’ choices, whereas the value of process data, such as response times, has received limited attention. The process data underlying a decision can contain valuable information about the agents’ preference. Methodology: We conducted two laboratory experiments with multiround bargaining between a supplier and a retailer, where the supplier had private information about production costs. The retailer proposed wholesale prices to the supplier, and the supplier decided whether to reject or accept them. The experiments were composed of treatments with response time information (RT-Treatments) and those without response time information (noRT-Treatments). Suppliers’ response times were transparent to retailers in the RT-Treatment but were not transparent to those in the noRT-Treatment. Results: We found that suppliers’ response times could indicate their preference strengths regarding retailers’ proposals. In the RT-Treatment, retailers could use suppliers’ response times to their advantage. Compared with those in the noRT-Treatment, retailers in the RT-Treatment made lower initial proposals. The final wholesale prices in agreements were also lower in this treatment, resulting in higher average retailer and channel profits but lower supplier profits. Managerial implications: We demonstrated that response time information in supply chain bargaining revealed bargainers’ preferences and affected bargaining dynamics and outcomes. Bargainers could use their partners’ response times to improve their bargaining outcomes. Funding: F. Chen gratefully acknowledges support from the Ministry of Science and Technology [Grant 2021ZD0200409] and the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 71803174 and 72173113]. Y. Zhao and U. Thonemann gratefully acknowledge support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [Grant TH 1425/2-1]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.1138 .
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