权力下放(生物学)
权力下放
公共行政
公共服务
公司治理
服务(商务)
中央政府
政府(语言学)
业务
地方政府
政治学
经济
经济
社会学
市场经济
哲学
人类进化
语言学
人类学
财务
作者
Yiran Li,Shuo Chen,Yaohui Peng
标识
DOI:10.1177/02750740231185849
摘要
Decentralization is often regarded as a panacea for achieving good governance. Yet few studies have explored how devolution (to subnational governments) affects policy agendas. In this article, we investigate how devolution affects two aspects of public service provision—economic growth and environmental protection based on the experience of China. The results show that the devolution simultaneously promotes local economic development and damages the environment. These mixed effects can be attributed to the administrative mechanism of the interaction between devolution and the distribution of government attention, which is more concerned with outcomes that can be observed in the short run rather than the long run. Our results highlight the complexity of governance and demonstrate the architecture for an effective policy framework design.
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