Do measurement methods matter? A meta-analysis of antecedents and outcomes of contractual governance in interorganisational relationships

AbstractExisting literature uses multiple measurement methods for contractual governance; however, it is unclear whether such differences impact the effect sizes of the relationships between contractual governance and its antecedents and outcomes in interorganisational relationships. This study revisits commonly explored relationships by examining the moderating impacts of the measurement factors. We meta-analysed 141 articles involving 32,763 interorganisational relationships. The results indicate that subjective and objective measurements cannot be interchangeable in certain relationships. Contractual governance, measured by multiple dimensions and multiple items per dimension, exhibits a stronger relationship with other constructs. Furthermore, mixing contract provisions and contract applications when using reflective indicators to measure contractual governance is not a serious issue. These findings advance our understanding of the boundary conditions of the relationships between contractual governance and other constructs. An implication for managers is that they should pay attention to both contracts per se and how contracts are subjectively perceived.Keywords: Contractual governancerelational governanceexchange hazardsperformancemeasurementmeta-analysis Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Data availability statementThe data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.Notes1 For precision, we focused on how contract measurement influences the effect sizes of the relationships between contractual governance and other constructs.2 We followed the procedure in Cao et al. (Citation2018) and searched 'contract' in the keywords rather than the abstract since the latter would produce too many results. Asterisk (*) represents any character. For example, 'opportunis*' include opportunistic, opportunism, etc.3 We expanded the scope of exchange hazards instead of restricting them to the three types in our framework. The aim is to avoid missing any study that focuses on other types of exchange hazards and selects the types we are interested in as control variables.4 The second, fifth, and sixth criteria are required for meta-analysis. The third criterion is required because our study focuses on contractual governance in interorganisational relationships. The fourth criterion is required, since the moderating impacts we focus on (i.e., subjective vs. objective measurements of contract provisions; contract provisions vs. mix of contract provisions and application) are related to contract provisions.Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) under Grand Number 72101175, 72001067, and 72031008.Notes on contributorsLihan ZhangLihan Zhang is an assistant professor at the School of Economics and Management, Hebei University of Technology, Tianjin, China. She received the Ph.D. degree in the management of projects from the University of Manchester, U.K., in 2018. Her research interests include contractual and relational governance, conflict and dispute management.Tianhuan DingTianhuan Ding is currently working towards the master's degree in management science and engineering with the School of Economics and Management, Hebei University of Technology, Tianjin, China. His research focuses on contractual governance and meta-analysis.Yongcheng FuYongcheng Fu is an assistant professor at the College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University. He received his Ph.D. degree in business and management from Alliance Manchester Business School, the University of Manchester in 2019. His research focuses on contractual governance, governance structure of infrastructure development, and meta-analysis.