Resilient Output Containment Control of Heterogeneous Multiagent Systems Against Composite Attacks: A Digital Twin Approach

This article delves into the distributed resilient output containment control of heterogeneous multiagent systems against composite attacks, including Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, false-data injection (FDI) attacks, camouflage attacks, and actuation attacks. Inspired by digital twin technology, a twin layer (TL) with higher security and privacy is employed to decouple the above problem into two tasks: 1) defense protocols against DoS attacks on TL and 2) defense protocols against actuation attacks on the cyber-physical layer (CPL). Initially, considering modeling errors of leader dynamics, distributed observers are introduced to reconstruct the leader dynamics for each follower on TL under DoS attacks. Subsequently, distributed estimators are utilized to estimate follower states based on the reconstructed leader dynamics on the TL. Then, decentralized solvers are designed to calculate the output regulator equations on CPL by using the reconstructed leader dynamics. Simultaneously, decentralized adaptive attack-resilient control schemes are proposed to resist unbounded actuation attacks on the CPL. Furthermore, the aforementioned control protocols are applied to demonstrate that the followers can achieve uniformly ultimately bounded (UUB) convergence, with the upper bound of the UUB convergence being explicitly determined. Finally, we present a simulation example and an experiment to show the effectiveness of the proposed control scheme.