市场流动性
竞赛(生物学)
资不抵债
业务
流动性风险
流动性危机
融资流动性
服务(商务)
金融体系
产业组织
货币经济学
财务
经济
营销
生态学
生物
作者
Liangliang Jiang,Ross Levine,Chen Lin
标识
DOI:10.1017/s0022109018000820
摘要
We use a new identification strategy to assess whether an intensification of competition among banks increases or decreases the provision of a key banking service: liquidity creation. Although theory offers conflicting predictions about the impact of competition on liquidity creation, we find that regulatory-induced competition reduces liquidity creation. Consistent with a subset of models emphasizing that banks pushed toward insolvency reduce risk-taking activities, we discover that regulatory-induced competition reduces liquidity creation more among banks with less risk-absorbing capacity (e.g., less profitable banks).
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