数据库事务
经济衰退
金融体系
业务
投资银行业务
金融危机
商业周期
投资(军事)
货币经济学
经济
大萧条
宏观经济学
劳动经济学
政治学
计算机科学
政治
法学
程序设计语言
标识
DOI:10.1080/1540496x.2016.1105682
摘要
In this article, I try to answer three questions: (1) How do relationship lending and transaction lending vary over the cycle? (2) How do economic systems that are more “bank oriented” perform compared to “market-oriented” systems? (3) What are the consequences on relationship banking of the recent structural bank regulation reforms adopted to separate specific investment and commercial banking activities? Building on some recent evidence, the main conclusions are as follows: (1) Relationship banks protect their clients in normal downturns; (2) when recessions coincide with a financial crisis, countries that rely relatively more on bank financing tend to be more severely hit; (3) the effects of structural bank regulation initiatives on relationship banking are uncertain.
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