An Evolutionary-Based Game Model of Honest and Dishonest Sellers

Many sellers are pursuing rapid profit growth, using the information asymmetry and virtuality of e-commerce platforms to destroy the reputation system of e-commerce platforms. Most of the existing defending strategies are implemented from the perspective of process or result governance, but these methods are difficult to fundamentally solve the phenomenon of fraud transactions. In this paper, we propose the seller’s honest asymmetric evolution game model in the monopolistic e-commerce market, based on the relevant knowledge of game theory mechanism design field. First, we theoretically analyze the stability of the model. Then, we verify the influence of the probability of sellers choosing honest strategy on the evolutionary stability of market credit through simulation experiments. Finally, we verified the reward and punishment parameters on the stability of the model. Experiment results show that increasing the probability that the monopolistic sellers choose honest strategies can promote the non-monopolistic of sellers to choose honest strategies, and appropriate reward and punishment measures can promote sellers to choose honest strategies.