Moral barrier to compassion: How perceived badness of sufferers dampens observers’ compassionate responses

Compassion has been theorized as a desirable prosocial emotion due to its potential to transcend arbitrary boundaries (e.g., race, physical distance) and motivate us to alleviate the suffering of all human beings. Our paper nevertheless examines a potential moral barrier to compassion––whether and how moral evaluations of the suffering and the sufferer hinder our compassion and prosocial motivation. In four pre-registered studies (total N = 421, within-participant design), we demonstrated that adult U.S. participants withheld their compassion and willingness to help when they perceived moral badness of the sufferer, even when the perceived moral badness did not directly cause the suffering. The effects were found in terms of diverse types of moral judgments, including the sufferers’ immoral intention (e.g., harming another; Study 1), bad moral character (e.g., being a dishonest person; Study 2), and even mere associations with groups perceived as deserving of suffering based on moral status (Studies 3-4). Deservedness judgment––how much the sufferer was viewed as deserving the suffering––mediated the effect between moral judgment and compassionate responses. Importantly, participants judged withholding compassion based on moral deservedness as what should be done and what morally good people would do, suggesting that people hold a normative view of the tendency that might make it difficult to overcome. Our findings thus reveal moral judgment as a barrier that prevents us from alleviating the suffering of all human beings.