不可见的
业务
数据治理
公司治理
会计
数据泄露
控制(管理)
产业组织
计算机安全
财务
经济
营销
数据质量
计算机科学
公制(单位)
管理
计量经济学
出处
期刊:The Accounting Review
[American Accounting Association]
日期:2021-04-09
卷期号:97 (2): 1-24
被引量:22
标识
DOI:10.2308/tar-2019-1033
摘要
ABSTRACT Economic theory suggests that negative peer events can result in market-wide spillovers that help unaffected firms take real actions to enhance corporate governance. Motivated by the SEC's concern about cybersecurity, I study the role of peer events in corporate governance using the setting of data breaches. While controlling for firm-specific time-varying unobservable characteristics, I find that peer data breaches are associated with a reduction in future internal control material weaknesses for non-breached firms. The association is robust to a changes analysis and varies cross-sectionally with breach, firm, and board characteristics. Inferences remain consistent when studying IT-related material weaknesses only. Finally, non-breached firms are more likely to have a cybersecurity expert on the top management team after a peer breach. My findings have important implications for mandatory disclosure regulation in general and, in particular, suggest that regulators can help reduce market-wide exposure to cyber risk by facilitating disclosure of cyber incidents. Data Availability: All data used in the study are publicly available. JEL Classifications: G34; M15.
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