审查
透明度(行为)
印象管理
业务
公共关系
公开披露
会计
制度理论
考试(生物学)
面板数据
政治学
经济
法学
社会心理学
心理学
管理
古生物学
计量经济学
工程类
生物
机械工程
作者
Christopher Marquis,Michael W. Toffel,Yanhua Zhou
出处
期刊:Organization Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2016-03-01
卷期号:27 (2): 483-504
被引量:507
标识
DOI:10.1287/orsc.2015.1039
摘要
Under increased pressure to report environmental impacts, some firms selectively disclose relatively benign impacts, creating an impression of transparency while masking their true performance. We theorize circumstances under which firms are less likely to engage in such selective disclosure, focusing on organizational and institutional factors that intensify scrutiny and expectations of transparency and that foster civil society mobilization. We test our hypotheses using a novel panel data set of 4,750 public companies across many industries that are headquartered in 45 countries during 2004–2007. Results show that firms that are more environmentally damaging, particularly those in countries where they are more exposed to scrutiny and global norms, are less likely to engage in selective disclosure. We discuss contributions to research on institutional theory, strategic management, and information disclosure.
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