A Verifiable Limited Test Ban for Anti-satellite Weapons

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. See Joseph Kahn, "China Confirms Test of Anti-Satellite Weapon," New York Times, January 23, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/23/world/asia/23cnd-china.html; T.S. Kelso, "Analysis of the 2007 Chinese ASAT Test and the Impact of its Debris on the Space Environment" (paper, Wailea, Hawaii, September 12-15, 2007) (presented at the Advanced Maui Optical and Space Surveillance Technologies Conference), http://celestrak.com/publications/AMOS/2007/AMOS-2007.pdf. 2. See NASA, Orbital Debris Program Office, Chart of Effective Number of Objects per 50 km Bin vs. Altitude (km), Orbital Debris Quarterly News 11, no. 2, April 2007, p. 10, http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv11i2.pdf (hereinafter NASA Orbital Debris Program Office chart). 3. See David Wright, "Space Debris," Physics Today, October 2007, p. 37, http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/wright-space-debris-physics-today.pdf. 4. See Union of Concerned Scientists, UCS Satellite Database, Web site, January 7, 2008, ed. The most recent version of the database, updated on October 1, 2009, may be found at http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/technical_issues/ucs-satellite-database.html. Also see Ross Liemer, "China's Anti-Satellite Weapons and U.S. National Security" (senior thesis, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, April 9, 2008), p. 38 (this is unpublished; please contact author for details). 5. See Nicholas L. Johnson, et al., "The Characteristics and Consequences of the Break-up of the Fengyun-1C Spacecraft," Acta Astronautica 63, no. 3 (July-August 2008): 133 and NASA Orbital Debris Program Office chart. 6. See Nick Brown, "US upgrades Aegis and SM-3 for anti-satellite role," Jane's International Defence Review, March 10, 2008, http://www.janes.com/articles/International-Defence-Review-2008/US-upgrades-Aegis-and-SM-3-for-anti-satellite-role.html. 7. See Nicholas L. Johnson, "Space Debris Assessment for USA-193" (presentation, Vienna, February 11-22, 2008) (45th session of the UN COPUOS Scientific and Technical Subcommittee), http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/pres/stsc2008/tech-16.pdf. 8. Christina Rocca, statement, Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, CD/PV.1091, February 15, 2008, http://disarmament.un.org/library.nsf/a61ff5819c4381ee85256bc70068fa14/a49d76a869ca952a8525745c0065be70/$FILE/cd-pv1091.pdf. 9. Liu Jianchao, press conference, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, China, February 21, 2008, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t409230.htm. 10. Russian Defense Ministry, quoted in, "Russian DM says US may test new weapon under pretext of destroying satellite," ITAR-TASS, February 16, 2008. 11. Pavel Podvig, "Russia and Military Uses of Space," in Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space, Pavel Podvig and Hui Zhang, eds. (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008), p. 22, http://www.amacad.org/publications/militarySpace.pdf. 12. "Russia Building Anti-Satellite Weapons," The Independent, March 5, 2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-building-antisatellite-weapons-1638270.html. 13. See "DRDO to Develop Anti-Satellite Technologies," domain-b.com, January 4, 2010, http://www.domain-b.com/defence/general/20100104_anti_satellite_oneView.html. 14. See Hashimoto Nobuaki, "Establishment of the Basic Space Law-Japan's Space Security Policy," National Institute for Defense Studies News, no. 123, July 2008, http://www.nids.go.jp/english/dissemination/briefing/2008/123.pdf. 15. "Decision for the Establishment of a Programme of Work for the 2009 session," CD/1864, May 29, 2009, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/E8846993B5213D59C12575DF0029EE11/$file/CD+1864+English.pdf. 16. See Victoria Samson, "Making a Mark in Space: An Analysis of Obama's Options for a New U.S. Space Policy," Arms Control Today 39, no. 8 (October 2009): 13-18, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_10/Samson. 17. See Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee, "Seeking a Human Spaceflight Program Worthy of a Great Nation," October 2009, pp. 105-108, http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/396093main_HSF_Cmte_FinalReport.pdf. 18. Satellite operators do not always announce when satellites cease operation or extend operation beyond their expected lifetime. See Union of Concerned Scientists, UCS Satellite Database, Web site, April 1, 2010, http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/technical_issues/ucs-satellite-database.html. 19. See Wright, "Space Debris." An undergraduate physics-level review of policy-relevant orbital science can be found in David Wright, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security: A Reference Manual (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2005). 20. UCS Satellite Database. 21. See also United States Space Command, "Space Surveillance," http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usspc-fs/space.htm. 22. Wright, "Space Debris," p. 36. 23. For more information on orbital debris, see NASA Orbital Debris Program Office, Frequently Asked Questions, July 2009, http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/faqs.html. 24. See Jer-Chyi Liou and Nicholas L. Johnson, "Risks in Space from Orbiting Debris," Science, January 20, 2006, pp. 340-341. 25. Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), "IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines," IADC-02-01, October 15, 2002, guideline 5.2.3, http://www.spacelaw.olemiss.edu/library/space/IntOrg/IADC/IADC-%2002-01%20-%20IADC%20Space%20Debris%20Mitigation%20Guidelines.pdf. A revised version of the guidelines, released in 2009, replaced the terms "space system" and "systems" with "spacecraft or orbital stage(s)." See IADC, "IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines,"IADC-02-01 Rev. 1, September 2007, http://www.iadc-online.org/Documents/Docu/IADC_Mitigation_Guidelines_Rev1_Sep07.pdf. 26. See Liou and Johnson, "Risks in Space from Orbiting Debris." 27. See NASA, Orbital Debris Program Office, "Fengyun-1C Debris: One Year Later," Orbital Debris Quarterly News 12, no. 1, January 2008, pp. 2-3, http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv12i1.pdf. 28. For more history of the Chinese, Russian, and U.S. ASAT programs, see Liemer, "China's Anti-Satellite Weapons and U.S. National Security," pp. 23-41. 29. See NASA, Orbital Debris Program Office, History of On-Orbit Satellite Fragmentations, 14th ed. (Houston, TX: Johnson Space Center, June 2008), p. 15, http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/SatelliteFragHistory/TM-2008-214779.pdf and Wright, "Space Debris," p. 39. 30. See Nicholas L. Johnson, Soviet Military Strategy in Space (London: Jane's Information Group, 1987), pp. 144-153. 31. See Gregory Kulacki and Jeffrey G. Lewis, "Understanding China's Antisatellite Test," The Nonproliferation Review 15, no. 2 (July 2008): 336-337 and Jeffrey Lewis, The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China's Search for Security in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), p. 160. 32. See Mure Dickie, Stephen Fidler, and Demetri Sevastopulo, "Chinese Space Test Raises US Suspicions," Financial Times, January 19, 2007. They wrote that "Between September 2004 and February 2006, a US official said, China launched three rockets capable of destroying a satellite." CNN senior Pentagon correspondent Jamie McIntyre, citing "U.S. government officials," reported that China had "three misses" prior to the destruction of Fengyun-1C. See "Lou Dobbs Tonight," CNN.com, January 18, 2007, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0701/18/ldt.01.html. Michael R. Gordon and David S. Cloud reported that "The United States had already detected two previous tests of the system" in 2005 and 2006. See Michael R. Gordon and David S. Cloud, "U.S. Knew of China's Missile Test, but Kept Silent," New York Times, April 23, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/23/washington/23satellite.html. 33. See Paul B. Stares, Space and National Security (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987), pp. 142-172. 34. See Paula A. DeSutter, "Is an Outer Space Arms Control Treaty Verifiable?" (remarks, Washington Roundtable on Science and Public Policy, Washington, D.C., March 4, 2008), http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/592.pdf. 35. See David Wright and Laura Grego, "Anti-Satellite Capabilities of Planned US Missile Defence Systems," Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 68 (December 2002-January 2003), http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd68/68op02.htm. 36. China announced in January 2010 that it successfully tested a "ground-based midcourse missile" interceptor. A Pentagon spokesperson confirmed that the U.S. military observed two missile launches and "an exo-atmospheric collision." It is unclear whether this Chinese weapon system has an altitude range similar to analogous U.S. systems. See Tania Branigan, "China 'Successfully Tests Missile Interceptor,'" Guardian, January 12, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/12/china-tests-missile-interceptor. 37. See Paul H. Nitze, "Security Challenges Facing NATO in the 1990s," address before the Nobel Institute, Leangkollen Seminar, Oslo, Norway, February 6, 1989, U.S. Department of State Bulletin (April 1989), p. 46, http://www.archive.org/download/departmentofstatb89unit/departmentofstatb89unit_bw.pdf. 38. Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nation Office at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland, "Verification Aspects of PAROS [Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space]," August 26, 2004, http://www.china-un.ch/eng/cjjk/cjjblc/cjlc/t154645.htm. 39. "Principal Questions and Comments on the Draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (CD/1839), and the Answers Thereto," CD/1872, August 18, 2009, http://disarmament.un.org/library.nsf/a61ff5819c4381ee85256bc70068fa14/4a10c7c900aa03c28525762500713d69/$FILE/cd-1872.pdf. 40. A prominent example of a "rules of the road" proposal suggests the negotiation of a code of conduct for space-faring nations, in some ways analogous to those that exist for ships, in which, inter alia, rules of safe space operation and traffic management are developed and "harmful interference against space objects" is avoided. See Michael Krepon, testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, March 18, 2009, http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/SF031809/Krepon_Testimony031809.pdf. 41. Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee, "Seeking a Human Spaceflight Program Worthy of a Great Nation," pp. 105-108. 42. For one nongovernmental version of the scope of a possible FMCT agreement, see International Panel on Fissile Materials, "Global Fissile Material Report 2008: Scope and Verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty," October 11, 2008, http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr08.pdf. 43. For example, see Hu Xiaodi, statement at the Plenary of the 2002 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, CD/PV.900, March 28, 2002, p. 21, http://disarmament.un.org/Library.nsf/a61ff5819c4381ee85256bc70068fa14/b16f9f8c1cf762d285256bdd0053524d/$FILE/pv900.pdf. 44. See Donald J. Kessler and Burton G. Cour-Palais, "Collision Frequency of Artificial Satellites: the Creation of a Debris Belt," Journal of Geophysical Research 83, no. A6 (June 1, 1978): 2637-2646; Liou and Johnson, "Risks in Space from Orbiting Debris"; and William J. Broad, "Orbiting Junk, Once a Nuisance, Is Now a Threat," New York Times, February 6, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/06/science/space/06orbi.html. 45. See Major General Willie B. Nance, "MG Nance Provides Update on Missile Test," press briefing, August 9, 2001, http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=1568 and Lt. General Ronald T. Kadish, press briefing, November 30, 2001, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2483. 46. See NASA, "NASA Procedural Requirements for Limiting Orbital Debris," May 14, 2009, http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/N_PR_8715_006A_/N_PR_8715_006A_.pdf and U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices, n.d., http://www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/usg_od_standard_practices.pdf. 47. Debris less than 5-10 cm in diameter is generally too small to be tracked by ground-based sensors. See National Research Council, Committee on Space Debris, Orbital Debris: A Technical Assessment (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 1995), p. 29. This idealized analysis assumes that the debris is made of aluminum and is spherical in shape. The timescale for orbital decay depends on the 11-year solar cycle, with resulting variations of factors of two or three around the time limits given here. The ballistic coefficient of debris, which depends on its shape, also affects decay time. In all but unusual cases, the smaller the debris, the faster its orbit will decay. 48. The destruction of USA-193, which the U.S. government stated was not a test of ASAT capability, created a large amount of debris that, though short-lived, had maximum orbital altitudes (apogees) well above the intercept altitude of 247 km. Indeed, NASA data from about two days after the intercept indicate a median debris apogee of 600 km. An agreement to ban ASAT tests above a certain altitude might also include a provision that requests that countries take steps to minimize the creation of debris whose apogees lie at altitudes much higher than the limit. We received the data on the USA-193 debris cloud from the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office on December 10, 2009. NASA is not responsible for the content of this article or the views expressed by the authors. 49. A dispute would have some precedent. In February 2009, when a commercial U.S. communications satellite collided with a Russian satellite believed to be defunct and non-maneuverable, a retired Russian general claimed (without citing any evidence) that the incident was, in fact, a U.S. military test of anti-satellite technology. See "Russian general says U.S. may have planned satellite collision," RIA Novosti, March 3, 2009, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090303/120392490.html. Also see William J. Broad, "Debris Spews Into Space After Satellites Collide," New York Times, February 11, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/12/science/space/12satellite.html. 50. If countries develop and deploy sea-launched ASAT weapons, it could become more difficult to determine the launching state of an ASAT missile. Although the U.S. government states that the destruction of USA-193 should not be viewed as a test of ASAT capability, the engagement nonetheless constituted the first destruction of a satellite in orbit by a missile launched at sea. 51. For instance, Kurt Gottfried, Richard Garwin, and Len Meeker, "A Draft Treaty Limiting Antisatellite Weapons," testimony for Controlling Space Weapons, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 98th Congress, 1st sess., May 18, 1983, pp. 112-129, http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/policy_issues/a-draft-treaty-limiting.html. More recently, Bruce W. MacDonald, "China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security," Council Special Report, no. 38, September 2008, p. 30, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/China_Space_CSR38.pdf. 52. Preamble to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, August 5, 1963, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4797.htm. 53. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of the Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing, 1996), p. 26. Additional informationNotes on contributorsRoss Liemer Ross Liemer examined anti-satellite weapons policy as an undergraduate at Princeton University, has spent the last year at Tsinghua University in China Christopher F. Chyba Christopher F. Chyba is professor of astrophysics and international affairs at Princeton University, where he directs the Program on Science and Global Security at the Woodrow Wilson School