知情人
拟合优度
公司治理
股东
会计
代理(哲学)
回归不连续设计
业务
委托代理问题
股息
代理成本
货币经济学
经济
财务
统计
法学
数学
政治学
认识论
哲学
作者
Ing-Haw Cheng,Harrison Hong,Kelly Shue
摘要
We find support for two key predictions of an agency theory of unproductive corporate social responsibility.First, increasing managerial ownership decreases measures of firm goodness.We use the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut to increase after-tax insider ownership.Firms with moderate levels of insider ownership cut goodness by more than firms with low levels (where the tax cut has no effect) and high levels (where agency is less of an issue).Second, increasing monitoring reduces corporate goodness.A regression discontinuity design of close votes around the 50% cut-off finds that passage of shareholder governance proposals leads to slower growth in goodness.
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