公众参与
公司治理
灵活性(工程)
协同治理
机制(生物学)
环境治理
进化博弈论
业务
经济
公共行政
公共经济学
环境经济学
经济体制
博弈论
政治学
微观经济学
哲学
管理
认识论
财务
作者
Zhaopeng Chu,Chen Bian,Jun Yang
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.eiar.2022.106782
摘要
This study explores how public participation can help reshape environmental governance in China. As China is committed to constructing an ecological civilization, a new participatory mechanism has become necessary for promoting environmental democracy. A non-cooperative tripartite evolutionary game is employed to model the dynamic strategy interactions among local governments, polluting enterprises, and the public for participatory governance. A new mechanism design for public participation is proposed to accomplish cooperative evolutionary equilibrium. Simulations show that with adequate support, public monitoring and activism can help release local governments' supervision burden while still being able to reach the desired outcome. Public participation benefits cooperative equilibrium by reducing governance costs and improving policy flexibility, especially when long-term aspirations of reputational effects and environmental tax reform are embraced. Strong support and ensured independence are crucial for unleashing the full power of public participation in environmental governance. From a methodology perspective, policy simulation in an evolutionary game framework represents a novel addition to the research toolbox for policy studies.
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