古诺竞争
伯特兰竞争
补贴
经济
贝特朗悖论(经济学)
微观经济学
经济盈余
竞赛(生物学)
产品差异化
社会福利
福利
产品(数学)
产业组织
寡头垄断
市场经济
生态学
几何学
数学
政治学
法学
生物
作者
Mingqing Xing,Sang-Ho Lee
标识
DOI:10.1080/10438599.2024.2386169
摘要
This study examines the impacts of consumer environmental awareness on green R&D subsidy policies under different market competition modes when firms adopt green strategies for emissions-reduction activities. We demonstrate that governments grant fewer subsidies to Cournot firms than Bertrand firms. Thus, Cournot firms produce lower outputs and invest less in green R&D. However, firms' profits and social welfare are higher (lower) in Cournot than in Bertrand firms if the product substitutability is high (low). We also investigate an endogenous competition mode game and find that a Cournot (Bertrand) competition is a socially desirable equilibrium when products substitutability is relatively high (low) while consumer environmental awareness is not sufficiently high (low). These findings suggest that through appropriate green subsidies, antitrust authorities should monitor not only consumer environmental awareness but also firms' competition mode coordination.
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