权力下放
垄断竞争
稳健性(进化)
经济
福利
分布(数学)
微观经济学
频道(广播)
消费者福利
产业组织
业务
自然资源经济学
作者
Junsong Bian,Xiaolei Guo,Kevin W. Li
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.tre.2017.09.011
摘要
Abstract This study reveals that the environmental tax gets less stringent when the manufacturer’s distribution channel becomes more decentralized. Contrary to the classic double marginalization problem, the first implication is that a monopolistic manufacturer benefits from decentralization when its technology is sufficiently polluting. Secondly, with two competing manufacturers, both are more likely to decentralize in equilibrium when their technologies are more polluting. Under certain conditions, decentralized manufacturers may enjoy higher profits thanks to tax cuts without affecting social welfare or consumer surplus. Various extensions of the base models confirm the robustness of the analytical results.
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