Kantian vs. Platonic: The Ambiguity of Schopenhauer’s Notion of Ideas Explained via Its Origins

Abstract The ‘Platonic Ideas’ in Schopenhauer’s metaphysics are (merely) appearances. On the other hand, as the immediate objecthood of the will, they are the essences of species and the only object of true aesthetic cognition, which leads beyond mere appearance. To explain this apparent incongruence, I offer an analysis of Schopenhauer’s early metaphysics (1809–1814), and its transformation into the metaphysics of will, fleshing out the several and divergent concepts of (Platonic) ‘idea’. Specifically, first, as part of his religious and neo-Platonic early philosophy; second, in the context of his ‘true criticism’ in the spirit of Kantian transcendental philosophy; third, as identical to the thing in itself as part of the metaphysics of will, heavily influenced by Kant’s notion(s) of ideas from CR and CJ . Explaining Schopenhauer’s mature notion of Platonic Ideas genetically as a set of homonymic notions helps us better explain its divergent meanings in WWR .