斯塔克伯格竞赛
供应链
信息不对称
频道(广播)
业务
博弈论
微观经济学
企业社会责任
价值(数学)
私人信息检索
利润(经济学)
产业组织
经济
营销
计算机科学
计算机安全
电信
公共关系
机器学习
政治学
作者
Qi Wang,Kebing Chen,Shengbin Wang,Wenjie Liu
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.apm.2022.02.025
摘要
In this paper, we consider a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer with corporate social responsibility (CSR), a retailer with sales effort, and a third party who is responsible for collecting used products. Different Stackelberg game models are constructed for three channel power structures under information symmetry and information asymmetry, respectively. Under information symmetry, we analyze the impacts of the channel power structure on the channel participants’ profits. We find that whether the channel power is beneficial to the game leader, or the followers depends on the level of the manufacturer's CSR. Furthermore, our results show that no matter which participant becomes the channel leader, her profit will increase as the level of CSR increases. Under information asymmetry, the value of information to the supply chain participants is investigated. We find that if the manufacturer is the channel leader, the value of information to her depends on the information's half range. However, for the retailer-led and third-party-led structures, the symmetric information is always beneficial to the channel leaders, so that they are always motivated to share their private information.
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