私人信息检索
经济
自然实验
基础(证据)
信息经济学
启示
微观经济学
精算学
业务
实验经济学
金融市场
财务
问答
行为经济学
营销
中国
议价能力
完整信息
金融经济学
公共信息
公共关系
政治学
经济模型
商业经济学
作者
Tingting Ding,Steven Lehrer
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2026-04-02
卷期号:72 (11): 9869-9888
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2024.07224
摘要
We conduct a series of laboratory experiments to examine whether the gradual exogenous revelation of sellers’ private information influences the occurrence of trades in a bilateral bargaining setting with a static lemon condition. We find that, although information does not increase efficiency, it reduces the likelihood that buyers incur losses when trading with low-quality sellers. Anticipating that additional signals will arrive, buyers hesitate to finalize deals immediately and exhibit a “waiting for news” effect, making sizable offer adjustments only when sufficient positive signals have accumulated. In contrast, informed sellers are less sensitive to news but appear to wait for the offer that they deem acceptable. This paper was accepted by Dorothea Kübler, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: T. Ding initiated this project while at the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics and thanks the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 72173076] for financial support. S. F. Lehrer thanks the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada for research support. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.07224 .
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