Exclusion or Subsidization? A Competitive Analysis of Quality Regulation Strategy for Two-Sided Platforms

双头垄断 质量(理念) 网络效应 业务 竞赛(生物学) 模式(计算机接口) 补贴 双边市场 产业组织 计算机科学 微观经济学 经济 市场经济 生物 认识论 操作系统 哲学 生态学 古诺竞争
作者
Gaoyan Lyu,Lin Tian,Wei Wang
出处
期刊:Production and Operations Management [Wiley]
被引量:12
标识
DOI:10.1177/10591478231224915
摘要

With two-sided platforms becoming an increasingly ubiquitous business model, quality is a vital factor for the success of high-technology platforms that face fierce competition. To maintain competency, high-technology platforms commonly use two quality regulation strategies: the exclusion strategy (E strategy), in which the platform denies access to low-quality complementors, and the subsidization strategy (S strategy), in which the platform provides a fixed subsidy to high-quality complementors. This paper investigates the optimal quality regulation strategy for platforms in a duopoly setting. We examine and compare three scenarios: (i) both platforms adopt the exclusion strategy, i.e. mode EE, (ii) both platforms adopt the subsidization strategy, i.e. mode SS, and (ii) one platform adopts the subsidization strategy while the other adopts the exclusion strategy, i.e. mode SE. First, we find that although the developer network size is larger and the platforms charge developers higher access fees under SS, the average quality and the consumer access fees are lower under SS than under EE, leading to lower profits for platforms. Second, under SE, in comparison with the platform that adopts the exclusion strategy, the platform that uses the subsidization strategy achieves lower average quality and larger network sizes on both sides but may set higher or lower access fees on both sides. Moreover, the platform under the subsidization strategy profits more (less) when the operation cost on the developer side is high (low). Third, asymmetric mode SE does not necessarily induce moderate outcomes for market participants compared to modes EE and SS. We also examine the equilibrium mode by considering platforms’ optimal strategies for quality regulation. Our analyses reveal that as the operation cost on the developer side increases, the equilibrium mode evolves from EE to SE/ES and then to SS. These results and insights are robust to several alternative assumptions.
最长约 10秒,即可获得该文献文件

科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI
科研通是完全免费的文献互助平台,具备全网最快的应助速度,最高的求助完成率。 对每一个文献求助,科研通都将尽心尽力,给求助人一个满意的交代。
实时播报
传奇3应助lcj1014采纳,获得10
1秒前
1秒前
蜗牛发布了新的文献求助10
3秒前
彭于晏应助zyt采纳,获得200
3秒前
jstagey完成签到,获得积分10
3秒前
luxkex发布了新的文献求助10
4秒前
毛豆发布了新的文献求助10
5秒前
晓晓发布了新的文献求助10
6秒前
Nole应助LIU采纳,获得10
7秒前
MildW完成签到,获得积分10
7秒前
Ethanyoyo0917发布了新的文献求助10
9秒前
9秒前
9秒前
9秒前
11秒前
木象爱火锅完成签到,获得积分10
12秒前
12秒前
12秒前
lcj1014发布了新的文献求助10
13秒前
常乐发布了新的文献求助20
13秒前
15秒前
jizy发布了新的文献求助10
15秒前
16秒前
16秒前
16秒前
16秒前
cyberman发布了新的文献求助10
16秒前
可爱的函函应助luxkex采纳,获得10
16秒前
17秒前
ding应助晓晓采纳,获得10
17秒前
18秒前
yixi发布了新的文献求助10
19秒前
20秒前
牛马发布了新的文献求助10
21秒前
圆满发布了新的文献求助10
21秒前
22秒前
pcg发布了新的文献求助10
22秒前
Nole应助hajauai采纳,获得10
22秒前
23秒前
gzy发布了新的文献求助10
23秒前
高分求助中
Principles of Economics, 11th Edition 10000
University Physics with Modern Physics, 16th edition 10000
(应助此贴封号)【重要!!请各用户(尤其是新用户)详细阅读】【科研通的精品贴汇总】 10000
Development of a Bridge Weigh-In-Motion System: A technology to convert the bridge response to the passage of traffic into data on vehicle configurations, speeds, times of travel and weights 1000
Molecular Mechanisms of Photosynthesis, 4th Edition 1000
Organic Reactions, Volume 116 1000
Current concepts in cutaneous toxicity : proceedings of the Fourth Conference on Cutaneous Toxicity, Washington, D.C., May 9-11, 1979 1000
热门求助领域 (近24小时)
化学 材料科学 医学 生物 纳米技术 工程类 有机化学 化学工程 生物化学 计算机科学 内科学 物理 复合材料 催化作用 细胞生物学 无机化学 光电子学 物理化学 电极 基因
热门帖子
关注 科研通微信公众号,转发送积分 7267645
求助须知:如何正确求助?哪些是违规求助? 8888425
关于积分的说明 18787908
捐赠科研通 6944417
什么是DOI,文献DOI怎么找? 3203347
关于科研通互助平台的介绍 2376267
邀请新用户注册赠送积分活动 2179204