This article examines the moment when American anticipations about Chinese economic growth turned decisively toward anxiety at a pivotal stage of the Cold War. It argues that perceptions of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) development initiatives, specifically the Great Leap Forward of 1958–1961, shaped the calculus of U.S. foreign policy strategy for the Pacific, and that orientalism was an integral component of the regional economic model championed by leading officials. Merging established racial and cultural tropes with anti-communist development theory, aka modernization, policymakers used economic hypotheses to wage geopolitical power. Resulting analyses simultaneously dismissed the prospect of Chinese development while expressing worry that the Great Leap could dangerously heighten PRC influence in the non-aligned world. To “teach” China, they prescribed a combination at the heart of liberal internationalism: massive capitalist development backed by military intervention. This response to the Great Leap Forward provides vital context for U.S. attempts to engage with the PRC during the 1960s even as American officials urged actions like the Asian Development Bank and escalation of war in Vietnam.