议价能力
微观经济学
付款
经济
讨价还价问题
不完全合同
产量(工程)
分布(数学)
频道(广播)
集合(抽象数据类型)
市场支配力
转移支付
业务
产业组织
经验证据
事前
功率(物理)
计量经济学
非线性定价
机构设计
实证研究
固定成本
比较静力学
生产(经济)
作者
Øystein Foros,Hans Jarle Kind,Greg Shaffer
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2026-10-23
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2025.03426
摘要
Two empirical patterns emerge in business-to-business settings, particularly in retail distribution channels such as grocery markets. First, linear contracts are widely observed alongside nonlinear contracts with fixed payments, despite the claimed efficiency advantages of the latter. Second, when fixed payments arise, they often flow from suppliers to retailers (slotting fees) rather than the reverse. We develop and analyze a model of multilateral bargaining in which a supplier negotiates separately with competing retailers to explain these patterns. The key mechanism is a trade-off between two distortions: under linear contracts, wholesale prices reflect bargaining power and can be either above or below the channel-profit-maximizing level, whereas under two-part tariffs, wholesale prices are set to maximize bilateral surplus independently of bargaining power but are systematically too low from an overall channel perspective because of rent shifting across relationships. As a result, neither contractual form uniformly dominates; instead, relative performance depends on how bargaining shapes gains from trade across firms. When bargaining leads to slotting fees, two-part tariffs yield higher channel profits than linear contracts, whereas when it would imply payments from retailers to suppliers, linear contracts may perform better. These findings offer a unified explanation for the persistence of linear contracts alongside two-part tariffs, the direction of fixed payments, and the conditions under which each contractual form is likely to arise. This paper was accepted by Miguel Villas-Boas, marketing. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2025.03426 .
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI