征用
激励
资产(计算机安全)
经济
政府(语言学)
武装冲突
收入
债务
业务
西班牙内战
财务
多样性(控制论)
经验证据
不完全合同
市场经济
经济体制
政治经济学
发展经济学
货币经济学
经济
公共财政
作者
Hoon Lee,Daehee Bak,Kyu Young Lee,Dongkyu Kim
标识
DOI:10.1177/00220027261425881
摘要
Intrastate conflict is often identified to increase the risk of foreign asset expropriation due to heightened incentives for short-term economic gains. In this paper, we investigate this notion both theoretically and empirically, and refine the conventional wisdom by examining conditions under which intrastate conflict incentivizes a host government to expropriate foreign assets. We argue that intrastate conflict increases the risk of expropriation when the government’s capability to finance civil conflict is significantly constrained. The empirical results indicate that intrastate conflict has a positive effect on the expropriation risk only when the government’s war financing capabilities are substantially low due to a high level of external debt burdens. The findings show that host governments take a strategic approach in revenue generation and the capability to finance war is the key to understanding the relationship between conflict and expropriation.
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