Normativity and Motivation. The Analytical Debate on Practical Reasons.

Contents\n\nIntroduction\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t1\n\nChapter 1 Internalism and externalism: some terminology\n\n1.1 Introduction\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t5\n1.2 Falk and Frankena\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t5\n1.3 The internalist position modified\t\t\t\t\t\t\t9\n1.4 The externalist position elaborated\t\t\t\t\t\t12\n1.5 Judgment internalism/externalism versus existence internalism/externalism\t15\n1.6 Other kinds of internalism and externalism\t\t\t\t\t17\n1.7 Varieties of existence internalism and externalism \t\t\t\t19\n1.8 Conclusion\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t26\n\n\nChapter 2 Bernard Williams on practical reasons\n\n2.1 Introduction\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t27\n2.2 The internal reason theory\t\t\t\t\t\t\t27\n2.3 Refining the sub-Humean model\t\t\t\t\t\t\t29\n2.4 Objections against external reasons\t\t\t\t\t\t40\n2.4.1 The no-explanatory-force objection\t\t\t\t\t41\n2.4.2 The no-motivational-fuel objection\t\t\t\t\t44\n2.4.3 The obscurity objection\t\t\t\t\t\t\t55\n2.5 Conclusion\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t59\n\n\nChapter 3 Michael Smith on practical reasons\n\n3.1 Introduction\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t60\n3.2 The moral problem\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t60\n3.3 Cognitivism, internalism, and Humean motivation\t\t\t\t65\n\t3.3.1 The objectivity of moral obligations\t\t\t\t\t65\t3.3.2 The practicality of moral judgments\t\t\t\t\t67\n\t3.3.3 The Humean theory of motivation\t\t\t\t\t70\n3.4 The conceptual analysis of normative reasons\t\t\t\t\t73\n\t3.4.1 Platitudes about normative reasons\t\t\t\t\t73\n\t3.4.2 The advice model (as opposed to the example model)\t\t76\n\t3.4.3 ‘If fully rational’-condition: Smith versus Williams\t\t\t79\n\t3.4.4 The analysis captures the platitudes\t\t\t\t\t84\n3.5 Moral rationalism: the solution to the moral problem\t\t\t\t88\n3.6 Smith’s analysis of normative reasons evaluated\t\t\t\t91\n\t3.6.1 The analysis trivializes convergence\t\t\t\t\t92\n\t3.6.2 Why do reasons have to be objective?\t\t\t\t\t94\n\t3.6.3 The analysis does not guarantee practicality\t\t\t\t96\n\t3.6.4 The analysis rests on a false platitude\t\t\t\t\t98\n\t3.6.5 Normative reasons and what I would desire if I were fully rational\t100\n\t3.6.6 The advice model is inconsistent with the convergence thesis\t102\n3.7 Conclusion\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t106\n\nAppendix 1: Michael Smith between moral realism and moral nihilism\t\t107\nAppendix 2: Michael Smith’s fetishism objection against judgment externalism\t111\n\n\nChapter 4 Derek Parfit on practical reasons \n\n4.1 Introduction\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t132\n4.2 Parfit’s externalism\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t132\n\t4.2.1 The obscurity objection rejected\t\t\t\t\t133\n\t4.2.2 The no-explanatory-force objection rejected\t\t\t\t135\n\t4.2.3 The no-motivation-fuel objection rejected\t\t\t\t136\n4.3 Parfit’s value-based reason theory\t\t\t\t\t\t139\n\t4.3.1 Internalism and the desire-based reason theory\t\t\t139\n\t4.3.2 Parfit’s argument against reductive desire-based reason views\t143\n\t4.3.3 Parfit’s argument against non-reductive desire-based reason views\t148\n\t4.3.4 Arguments in favour of the value-based reason theory\t\t154\n4.4 Parfit’s normative non-naturalism\t\t\t\t\t\t161\n4.4.1 Korsgaard’s criticism of realism\t\t\t\t\t163\n4.4.2 Korsgaard’s constructivism\t\t\t\t\t\t166\n4.4.3 Parfit’s criticism of constructivism\t\t\t\t\t168\n4.4.4 The non-naturalist account of normativity evaluated\t\t\t174\n4.5 Conclusion\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t179\n\nAppendix: Varieties of moral realism\t\t\t\t\t\t180\n\n\nChapter 5 Harry Frankfurt on practical reasons\n\n5.1 Introduction\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t194\n5.2 Frankfurt’s theory of care and love\t\t\t\t\t\t194\n\t5.2.1 The hierarchical model\t\t\t\t\t\t\t195\n\t5.2.2 Care\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t200\n\t5.2.3 Love\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t211\n5.3 The love-based reason theory\t\t\t\t\t\t\t215\n5.4 The love-based reason theory evaluated\t\t\t\t\t\t225\n\t5.4.1 Love and desire: both motivating, both natural\t\t\t225\n\t5.4.2 The groundlessness objection\t\t\t\t\t\t227\n\t5.4.3 The authority of love\t\t\t\t\t\t\t239\n\t5.4.4 The objection of normative triviality\t\t\t\t\t244\n\t5.4.5 The love-based reason theory and morality\t\t\t\t248\n5.5. Conclusion\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t254\n\n\nBibliography\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t256