Rezoning at the threshold of two systems: regionalised party–statecraft in China’s Greater Bay Area

ABSTRACTDuring China's reform era, dominant narratives described a transition away from centralised planning in favour of mutually reinforcing processes of liberalisation and decentralisation. Under Xi Jinping, the talk has increasingly been of the recentralisation of authoritarian-state powers and party discipline. Questioning both reform-era transition narratives and equally simplifying claims about their recent reversal, the paper argues for an enriched treatment of party–state spatiality, understood as a polymorphic and multi-scalar process, rather than simply a more complex one. In the emergent Greater Bay Area megaregion, 'new era' zoning strategies are being repurposed as drivers of pathfinding reforms animated by the party–state, in contrast to received readings of zones as single-purpose instruments of liberalisation.KEYWORDS: regional governanceparty–statecraftzoningGreater Bay AreaChinaJEL: N95P21, R5 DISCLOSURE STATEMENTNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.Notes1. The GDFTZ is one of 11 pilot free trade zones established by the State Council (beginning in 2013) as 'opening-up' initiatives intended to spearhead economic reform, boost foreign trade and facilitate investment, while extending control of economic sectors and industries related to national security. The GDFTZ is charged to pursue cooperation and integration projects with Hong Kong and Macao, with the Guangdong provincial government authorised to 'take the lead'.2. This includes the expanding role of 'leading small groups' (lingdao xiaozu), such as the Guangdong–Hong Kong–Macao Greater Bay Area Construction Leading Group, and the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, which became a leading group in 2020, only to be revamped once more in 2023 as a Work Office of the Communist Party Central Committee (Lam & Wu, Citation2023).3. Some of Shenzhen's mayors and party secretaries went on to ascend the party hierarchy (Zhang Gaoli, 1997–2001; Li Hongzhong, 2003–07; Xu Qin, 2010–17), while others faced removal from office or even criminal charges (Xu Zongheng, 2005–09; Chen Rugui, 2017–21).4. While development authority is delegated all the way down, implementation of the plan occurs under the guidance and coordination of provincial and central agencies and party organs such as the GDFTZ Work Leading Group, the GBA Construction Leading Group and the NDRC.5. These are Qianhai Construction Investment Group, Qianhai Financial Holdings and Qianhai Service Group.6. Nansha has been leveraging these ties through partnerships with Hong Kong universities (such as the Henry Fok Research Institute at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology), while also pursuing programmes to attract Hong Kong residents.Additional informationFundingThis research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) Insight Grant [435-2021-0634].