机会主义
知情人
股东
业务
会计
库存(枪支)
利用
集体诉讼
诉讼
内幕交易
信息不对称
大裂谷
货币经济学
经济
财务
公司治理
政治学
法学
机械工程
国家(计算机科学)
物理
计算机安全
算法
天文
计算机科学
市场经济
工程类
作者
Brian J. Bushee,Daniel J. Taylor,Christina Zhu
标识
DOI:10.2308/tar-2020-0624
摘要
ABSTRACT Although the shareholder benefits of investor conferences are well-documented, evidence on whether these conferences facilitate managerial opportunism is scarce. We examine whether managers opportunistically exploit heightened attention around the conference to “hype” the stock. We find that (1) managers increase the quantity of voluntary disclosure leading up to the conference, (2) these disclosures are more positive in tone and increase prices to a greater extent than post-conference disclosures, and (3) these disclosures are more pronounced when insiders sell their shares immediately prior to the conference. In circumstances where pre-conference disclosures coincide with pre-conference insider net selling, we find evidence of a significant return reversal––large positive returns before the conference and large negative returns after the conference––and that the firm is more likely to be named in a securities class action lawsuit. Collectively, our findings are consistent with some managers hyping the stock prior to the conference.
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