Political competition and the rechanneling of corporate bribery into politically connected charity donations: Evidence from South Korea

Abstract Research Summary We examine the relationship between political competition, corporate bribery, and corporate contributions to politically connected charities, and whether there is a shift from covert to concealed corporate nonmarket action as political competition increases. Panel analysis using rare corporate bribery and charity donations panel data from South Korea reveals that as political competition increases, corporate bribery decreases, whereas corporate contributions to politically connected charities increase. Subsequent panel analysis uncovers that amid increased political competition, firms that made larger bribes in the prior year contribute more to politically connected charities in the subsequent year, and that this form of rechanneling is more pronounced for smaller business groups. Implications are discussed. Managerial Summary This study argues that the field of strategy needs to do more to analyze firms' illegal strategic behavior, both to gain a deeper understanding of business practices in the corporate world and to develop recommendations for policymakers on how to curb such behavior over time. Using comprehensive and rare firm‐level data on bribery of high‐level government officials and donations to politically connected charities from South Korea, this study analyzes how businesses rechannel their bribery of senior‐level politicians to contributions to politically connected charities as the country's level of political competition becomes stronger. This study proposes a theory of rechanneling and demonstrates support for the theory using the extensive data set on bribery and politically connected charity donations from South Korea.