折旧(经济)
竞赛(生物学)
电池(电)
业务
服务(商务)
产业组织
电动汽车
透视图(图形)
产品(数学)
经济
营销
商业
环境经济学
汽车工业
汽车工程
微观经济学
电动汽车
货币经济学
运营管理
焦虑
质量(理念)
消费者行为
作者
Li Hu,Zhuoran Ge,Xin Wen,Xiangyu Zhou
标识
DOI:10.1109/tem.2025.3641294
摘要
Battery-as-a-Service (BaaS) strategy is viewed as a promising solution to alleviate consumer anxiety about the future depreciation of electric vehicles (EVs). This sales strategy involves leasing batteries rather than selling them outright, thereby mitigating the negative impact of rapid battery depreciation on vehicle value. This paper develops a game-theoretic model to investigate the impact of BaaS on competition between electric and fuel vehicles. The profit-maximizing EV manufacturer chooses between the Complete-Vehicle-Sales (CVS) strategy and the BaaS strategy. Our analysis yields three main findings. First, to enhance profits through BaaS over CVS, an EV manufacturer must ensure that the EV depreciation rate with BaaS is at least slightly lower than with CVS. Achieving higher EV sales under BaaS compared to CVS requires a further reduction in depreciation. Second, a win-win situation for both vehicle manufacturers occurs if the EV depreciation rate under BaaS is reduced to a moderate level. Considering additional battery acquisitions in BaaS can result in a mutually beneficial outcome for the three parties, including the battery supplier. Third, a lower depreciation rate can increase consumer surplus, but it does not always benefit the environment, as it may lead to higher overall vehicle purchases and usage in the market
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