广告
共同价值拍卖
业务
产品(数学)
在线广告
消费者隐私
远期拍卖
互联网隐私
信息隐私
微观经济学
计算机科学
拍卖理论
经济
互联网
几何学
数学
万维网
作者
Alexandre de Cornière,Romain de Nijs
标识
DOI:10.1111/1756-2171.12118
摘要
An online platform auctions an advertising slot. Several advertisers compete in the auction, and consumers differ in their preferences. Prior to the auction, the platform decides whether to allow advertisers to access information about consumers (disclosure) or not (privacy). Disclosure improves the match between advertisers and consumers but increases product prices, even without price‐discrimination. We provide conditions under which disclosure or privacy is privately and/or socially optimal. When advertisers compete on the downstream market, disclosure can lead to an increase or a decrease in product prices depending on the nature of the information.
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