尽职调查
业务
透明度(行为)
会计
股东
激励
自愿披露
可比性
利用
公开披露
利益相关者
情感(语言学)
企业社会责任
公司治理
财务
公共关系
经济
市场经济
法学
工程类
哲学
组合数学
机械工程
语言学
计算机科学
计算机安全
数学
政治学
标识
DOI:10.2308/tar-2020-0178
摘要
ABSTRACT This paper studies whether and how mandatory nonfinancial disclosure affects firms' real decisions. I exploit a disclosure regulation enacted in California, which mandates that firms disclose how they conduct due diligence to address their suppliers' human rights abuses. I find that treated firms increase their supply chain due diligence, and their suppliers' human rights performance improves following the regulation. The effects are stronger when firms face greater pressure from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and socially conscious shareholders, when customers have greater incentives to use the newly disclosed information, and when the regulation leads to a larger increase in information comparability. Collectively, the results suggest that mandatory nonfinancial disclosure can affect firms' real decisions through market mechanisms and that stakeholder responses play a key role. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G14; G18; G38; J80; K22; K31; K38; L23; M41; M48.
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