激励
业务
授权
服务(商务)
过程(计算)
产品(数学)
可信赖性
营销
建议(编程)
产业组织
过程管理
互联网隐私
微观经济学
计算机科学
经济
数学
操作系统
几何学
管理
程序设计语言
作者
Özalp Özer,Upender Subramanian,Yu Wang
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2017-01-23
卷期号:64 (1): 474-493
被引量:79
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2016.2617
摘要
In many market settings, a customer often obtains assistance from a supplier (or service provider) to make better-informed decisions regarding the supplier’s product (or service). Because the two parties often have conflicting pecuniary incentives, customer trust and supplier trustworthiness play important roles in the success of these interactions. We investigate whether and how the process through which assistance is provided can foster trust and trustworthiness, and thus facilitate better cooperation. We compare three prevalent assistance processes: information sharing, advice provision, and delegation. We propose that, even if the pecuniary incentives of both parties do not vary from one assistance process to another, the assistance process itself impacts the customer’s and supplier’s nonpecuniary motives that give rise to trust and trustworthiness. Consequently, the assistance process affects the level of cooperation and payoffs. We test our behavioral predictions through laboratory experiments based on a retail distribution setting. We quantify the impact of different assistance processes on trust, trustworthiness and channel performance, and identify the underlying drivers of those impacts. Our results offer insight into the role of the assistance process in managing supplier assistance effectively and why certain assistance processes may lead to more successful outcomes than others even if the pecuniary incentives remain unaltered. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2617 . This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.
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