囚徒困境
互惠(文化人类学)
心理学
困境
随机博弈
社会心理学
互惠的
超理性
社会困境
最大化
博弈论
强互惠
社会决策
旅行者困境
价值(数学)
社会偏好
数理经济学
认知心理学
正常形式游戏
非合作博弈
重复博弈
经济
认识论
计算机科学
哲学
语言学
机器学习
作者
Melissa Acevedo,Joachim I. Krueger
摘要
Classic game theory considers defection to be the rational choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Although defection maximizes a player's gain regardless of the opponent's choice, many players cooperate. We suggest that cooperation can be explained in part by expectations of reciprocal behavior, that is, by the belief that players facing the same situation probably will come to the same decision. In Experiment 1, expectations of reciprocity were experimentally manipulated. As predicted, cooperation increased monotonically with these expectations. In Experiment 2, experimentally manipulated expectations of opponent cooperation were not associated with higher rates of cooperation. These findings are interpreted in light of a general model of payoff maximization, and implications for other models (e.g., social value orientation) are discussed.
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