透明度(行为)
清晰
经济
货币政策
中央银行
通货膨胀目标
货币经济学
信号
膨胀(宇宙学)
前向制导
宏观经济学
信贷渠道
微观经济学
计算机科学
物理
生物化学
化学
计算机安全
理论物理学
作者
Gabriel Caldas Montes,Luciana Mendes Oliveira,Alexandre Curi,Rodolfo Tomás da Fonseca Nicolay
标识
DOI:10.1080/00036846.2015.1083091
摘要
ABSTRACTThe literature on transparency and central bank communication and the literature on disagreement about expectations are evolving; however, both have been evolving separately. Despite the advances in the literature, several key issues remain open and there are gaps to be filled. Therefore, this study analyses the effects of monetary policy signalling and clarity of central bank communication on disagreement about inflation expectations. It also investigates whether greater transparency coincides with lower levels of disagreement in inflation expectations in Brazil. The findings suggest that transparency is important to reduce disagreement about inflation expectations. Moreover, our estimates indicate that central bank communication and clarity affect disagreement about inflation expectations in Brazil.
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