入侵
旁道攻击
变压器
电子工程
电气工程
噪音(视频)
计算机科学
工程类
计算机安全
密码学
地质学
电压
人工智能
地球化学
图像(数学)
作者
Mateo D. Roig Greidanus,Silvanus D’silva,Shantanu Gupta,Debotrinya Sur,Sudip K. Mazumder,Mohammad B. Shadmand
标识
DOI:10.1109/tpel.2024.3391217
摘要
This paper delves into the intricacies of electromagnetic side-channel noise intrusion (EM-SNI) and its impact on the voltage sensors of a solid-state transformer (SST). As described in this work, the EM-SNI attack can be easily deployed using a small antenna, and its effects spread without any electrical contact with the power-electronics hardware circuitry or measurement signal feedback. The cyber-physical attack is performed by injecting noise at very high frequencies (MHz range), and due to the aliasing effects of the analog-to-digital converter sampling, corrupt the feedback signal as sub- and super-60 Hz harmonic frequencies. Hence, this paper details how the EM-SNI mechanism works and analytically discusses the aliasing effects on noise frequency injections that could potentially harm the SST system. Subsequently, a method to detect and mitigate the impact of electromagnetic side-channel noise injection (EM-SNI) on the SST system is proposed to counteract its effects. The method involves a cross-correlation-based intrusion detection and voltage feedback observation on the instantaneous power-transfer relationship for mitigation. Experimental results confirm the effectiveness of the proposed methodology and are presented throughout the paper.
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