代理(哲学)
生产力
劳动经济学
经济
效率工资
代理成本
工资
宏观经济学
财务
公司治理
认识论
股东
哲学
作者
Xinwei Dong,Dean Hyslop,Daiji Kawaguchi
摘要
Firms frequently provide general skill training for workers. Theories propose that labor market frictions entail wage compression, generate larger productivity gains than wage growth to skill acquisition, and motivate a firm to offer general skill training, but few studies directly test them. We use unusually rich data from a temporary help service firm that records both workers' wages and their productivity as measured by the fees charged to client firms. We find that skill acquired through training and learning by doing increases productivity more than wages, with such wage compression accounting for half of the average 40% productivity growth over 5 years of tenure.
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