担保
服务提供商
服务(商务)
计算机科学
纳什均衡
博弈论
计算机安全
运筹学
业务
微观经济学
经济
营销
工程类
政治学
法学
作者
D. N. Prabhakar Murthy,Nat Jack
标识
DOI:10.1057/s41274-016-0125-z
摘要
When a warranty provider outsources warranty servicing to an external service agent this agent may act in a fraudulent manner. In this paper we consider a special case of service agent fraud—with the service agent overbilling the warranty provider for some of the warranty claims. A detailed inspection of a claim may be made to identify whether or not the service agent has committed fraud, but this inspection involves an additional cost to the warranty provider. This cost may be recovered by imposing a penalty on the service agent whenever a fraud is committed and it is detected. This penalty is specified in the maintenance service contract. A game theoretic approach is used to find the optimal overbilling strategy for the service agent and the optimal inspection strategy for the warranty provider. The optimal solution is the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of a static game between the two parties.
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