Stripped of Agency: The Paradoxical Effect of Employee Monitoring on Deviance

Organizations have long sought to mitigate the risks associated with unsupervised employee conduct (e.g., employee deviance). To combat these risks, organizations often employ performance monitoring as a way to externally regulate their employees’ behavior. This external regulation is quite effective for minimizing targeted deviance. Yet, deviance has many forms, and effectively deterring deviance in general may require other processes, such as enhancing employees’ self-regulatory capacity. In this research, we call into question whether monitoring may always serve its intended function. Specifically, we argue that there is a paradoxical effect of monitoring whereby it undermines the self-regulatory systems of monitored individuals. Drawing on social cognitive theory, we hypothesize that monitored individuals perceive a diminished sense of agency, which makes them more likely to displace their sense of moral responsibility. Contrary to what organizations expect and previous work predicts, this process ultimately leads individuals to engage in more (not less) deviance. Across a field and an experimental study, we find converging support for our predictions and rule out alternative mechanisms. This research provides important theoretical and practical insights into the unintended consequences of monitoring employees.