贷款
业务
激励
信用记录
信用评级
违约概率
资信证明
违约
财务
信用风险
货币经济学
精算学
经济
微观经济学
作者
Li Liao,Xiumin Martin,Ni Wang,Zhengwei Wang,Jun Yang
标识
DOI:10.2308/tar-2021-0191
摘要
ABSTRACT Using two natural field experiments, we examine how warning individual retail borrowers that their loan performance will be reported to a public credit registry before and after the loan take-up affects their borrowing behavior. We show that credit warnings reduce default rates by 3.7 to 7 percentage points and increase loan take-up rates by 4.1 percentage points, which suggests that credit warnings benefit both lenders and borrowers. The main drivers appear to be borrowers’ anticipation of a reduction in lenders’ informational rents and improved repayment incentives. Moreover, the reduction in default rates is comparable for borrowers who receive the credit warning before and after the loan take-up. As credit warnings received before but not after a loan take-up can affect the borrower pool, and thus the overall credit risk of the pool, the results suggest that credit warnings have little net effect on the pool’s credit risk due to selection. JEL Classifications: G10; G21; G23.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI