Quadripartite evolutionary game analysis of low carbon production strategy of offshore outsourcing under transnational cooperative supervision mechanism

To solve the delineation of responsibilities for low-carbon production under offshoring, an increasing number of supply chain members and supervisions have carried inter-governmental cooperation. This study proposes the low-carbon production mechanism of offshoring based on “cooperation between the two countries” and outsourcing “incentives”. A quadripartite evolutionary game model of contract manufacturer (CM), original equipment manufacturer (OEM), the government of the CM (G CM ) and the government of the OEM (G OEM ) is constructed. The stability of multi agent strategy and simulation experiments are analyzed. The result shows that only when the cost of rent-seeking, outsourcing fines, regulatory penalties and carbon taxes are greater than the limit threshold, can the optimal combination of low-carbon production of the outsourcing enterprises and strict supervision by the two governments be promoted. The evolution system of offshore outsourcing is more affected by the willingness of both parties to participate, and carbon tariff is a necessary policy, but the implementation effect is limited to unilateral low-carbon production, and the carbon tax has a better effect on the promotion of the four parties to achieve the ideal state. The incentive contract promotes the OEM to produce low-carbon products under a non-ideal state, and controls the inflow of products composed of ordinary components into the market to a certain extent. Regulatory penalties in inter-governmental contracts are more binding on the G CM than regulatory incentives. • Clarifies the influencing factors and mechanisms of the decision-making of the four parties of offshore low-carbon production. • Evolutionary game model of four players: CM, OEM, the government of CM and the government of the OEM is constructed. • Explore the stable strategy combination and conditions of transnational offshoring game. • Study the policies between contract manufacturer and original equipment manufacturer to promote low-carbon production.