摘要
I am most grateful to Paul Patton, the editor of the Journal of Social and Political Philosophy, for organising this symposium so soon after the appearance of my book on The State (2023).And I deeply appreciate the careful attention given to the work by my other symposiasts.I propose to respond to them in the order in which they treat topics in the book.Those topics are all covered in the first four chapters of the book.Thus, the symposium neglects the questions covered in the final two: whether the state is limited normatively by pre-political, natural rights; and whether it is limited empirically by the need for the economy to be self-regulating.Before replying to my commentators in turn, a general comment may be useful.Some of them assume that the claims I make about the function of the state, and about what that function supports, are designed to reflect my commitment to a neo-republican theory of the ideal or just polity (Pettit 1997; 2012;2014).This is mistaken.My claims about the function of the state, and the functional desiderata that apply to the state, are meant to be independent of normative theory and, like a prolegomenon, to constrain what such a theory can argue about the requirements of justice.The constraints identified apply to neo-republican as well as other theories, though I think that republicans can readily endorse them; hence, as I say in this book, I plan a companion volume, From State to Republic. Kazutaka InamuraInamura offers a very clear account of the argument in the first chapter, that the issue of whether the state has a defining function is well addressed by looking at a counterfactual question of genealogy.The question is whether something deserving of the name of state would be robustly likely to emerge among creatures of our kind, living in conditions of the sort that have prevailed since the agricultural revolution, and enjoying a qualified equality.To explain the terms of the question, such an institution would be robustly likely to emerge, if its appearance did not depend on a fortuitous occurrence: say, on the good luck of someone proposing the idea and organising an assembly to implement it.And the humanoids would enjoy a qualified equality just to the extent that at least one privileged class of individuals is large enough for only some of them to occupy ruling positions and equal enough in power for no one individual or family or clique to be able to take over unilaterally.The claim in the first chapter, as Inamura clearly charts, is that the humanoids in the relatively equal class -I often assume for convenience that this includes allwould be robustly likely to evolve conventions and norms and to give those regularities the status of proper laws with the acceptance of measuresif you like, decision-maker lawsfor clarifying and changing the regularities, and for identifying and penalising offences: this story is familiar from the classic work of H. L. A. Hart in the 1960s (2012.But, so the argument goes, the emergence of such a legal system would introduce legislative authorities for ruling on what exactly the norms require, and judicial and executive authorities Pettit, The State 225