特洛伊木马
后门
硬件特洛伊木马
计算机科学
可扩展性
脆弱性(计算)
嵌入式系统
国家(计算机科学)
计算机安全
算法
操作系统
作者
Zhixin Pan,Prabhat Mishra
标识
DOI:10.1109/tc.2023.3251864
摘要
The globalized semiconductor supply chain significantly increases the risk of exposing System-on-Chip (SoC) designs to hardware Trojans. While machine learning (ML) based Trojan detection approaches are promising due to their scalability as well as detection accuracy, ML-based methods themselves are vulnerable from Trojan attacks. In this paper, we propose a robust backdoor attack on ML-based Trojan detection algorithms to demonstrate this serious vulnerability. The proposed framework is able to design an AI Trojan and implant it inside the ML model that can be triggered by specific inputs. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed AI Trojans can bypass state-of-the-art defense algorithms. Moreover, our approach provides a fast and cost-effective solution in achieving 100% attack success rate that outperforms state-of-the art methods based on adversarial attacks.
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