激励
多样性(政治)
晋升(国际象棋)
业务
情感(语言学)
劳动力
营销
劳动力多元化
公共经济学
公共关系
经济
微观经济学
心理学
政治学
经济增长
政治
法学
沟通
标识
DOI:10.2308/tar-2023-0601
摘要
ABSTRACT Companies are offering managers compensation incentives to increase promotions of under-represented employees to higher level organizational positions (hereafter, “diversity incentives”). This study uses an experiment to examine how diversity incentives affect managers’ promotion decisions and employees’ effort choices before and after those decisions. The results suggest that managers’ diversity incentives do not affect employees’ pre-promotion effort choices. Additional analyses indicate that both over- and under-represented employees expect managers to promote them based on effort instead of group membership. Consistent with predictions, diversity incentives increase the likelihood that managers promote under-represented employees whose pre-promotion efforts are comparable to their over-represented colleagues’ efforts. After the promotion decision, nonpromoted employees whose managers receive diversity incentives choose the lowest effort, regardless of group membership. Collectively, these results inform companies about the potential costs and benefits of using diversity incentives by demonstrating that diversity incentives can increase diversity in promotions but reduce nonpromoted employees’ efforts. Data Availability: Data are available from the author upon request.
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