Disputed geometries of great power politics: US–China perspectives on minilateralism

This article analyzes the theoretical and empirical development of contemporary minilateralism through the lens of US–China great power competition. The aim is to assess four theoretically informed predictions about US and Chinese minilateral formation: (a) the US would form minilaterals more readily than China, (b) the US would appreciate minilaterals more than China, (c) the US and China would have differing rhetorical approaches to discussing the value of minilaterals, and (d) that minilaterals formed in the contemporary period would tend toward institutionalisation in order to ensure their persistence (a reflection of the long-term nature of Sino-US competition). Following the Introduction, section II provides a descriptive, empirical overview of the perspectives on minilateralism in Washington and Beijing, focusing on the US judgment that they are an asymmetric advantage for the US, and China's evaluation that they are a risk to its foreign and security policy strategy. Section III examines a set of US-led minilateral cases (Quad 2.0, AUKUS, US-Japan-South Korea, US-Japan-Australia, and US-Japan-Philippines) and the Chinese responses to their development. Finally, section IV concludes with thoughts on policy implications, as well as other avenues of research.