激励
付款
期望理论
显著性(神经科学)
激励计划
互惠(文化人类学)
微观经济学
程式化事实
公共经济学
经济
业务
心理学
社会心理学
认知心理学
财务
宏观经济学
作者
Hans Frankort,Argyro Avgoustaki
标识
DOI:10.1177/01492063211016032
摘要
Prior theory suggests that incentive plans, such as piece-rate or commission plans, motivate good performance because employees anticipate that current performance will generate matching future incentive payments. In this article, we move beyond reward expectancy to argue that performance can also derive from employees’ reactive responses to received incentive payments. We propose a salience-based theory casting incentive payments as recurring temporal markers that periodically increase the salience of the incentive plan, to which employees respond by temporarily increasing incentivized and unincentivized performance. We introduce multivariate time-series methods to test our hypotheses in longitudinal data spanning 169 weeks (1,183 days), drawn from an online firm using an incentive plan for its customer-support employees. While we find no evidence that incentive payments affect the dynamics of incentivized performance, they do temporarily boost several unincentivized behaviors and outcomes. Combined with fieldwork, these findings support our proposed mechanism of “salience-induced reciprocity”—that is, the temporary reciprocity in response to a periodic increase in the salience of the incentive plan. This article contributes to a more complete understanding of performance and effort dynamics in incentive plans, offers new inroads into studying temporality in the functioning of human resources practices, and provides other future research avenues.
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